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Abstract 
John David Roche 
From Commander to Commandant: The Transformation of 
British Major General James Pattison During the 
American War of Independence, 1777 – 1780 
(Under the direction of Wayne E. Lee) 
 
This thesis examines the unique position of a garrison commandant responsible for a 
city with a substantial civilian population within the British Army and its role in the larger war 
for America by examining the dual tenures of Major General James Pattison as Commandant 
of the Royal Artillery in North America between September 24, 1777 and September 4, 1780 
and Commandant of the City and Garrison of New York from July 5, 1779 to August 13, 1780.  
Pattison’s hybrid civil-military responsibilities as the commandant of New York City 
convinced him that effective governance was essential to mobilizing Loyalist support and 
provided him with an opportunity to demonstrate the military potential of Loyalists in the 
middle colonies. 
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Introduction 
 
I am fully of opinion that all the efforts Great Britain can make will never 
effectually conquer this great continent, in which, notwithstanding all that 
has been said of friends to Government [Loyalists] here, and friends to 
Government there, yet there is scarcely one to be met with from one end 
of it to the other. 
 
Brigadier General James Pattison to his brother, December 1777 
Commandant [Commander] of the Royal Artillery in North America 
 
We already learn that the recent Display of Loyalty here [New York City], 
with the great Acquisition of Force it produced, has had its Effects upon  
the Friends of Government without the Lines, as well as upon the Enemy. 
 
Major General James Pattison to Lord George Germain, February 22, 1780 
Commandant of the City and Garrison of New York 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the unique position of a garrison commandant 
responsible for a city with a substantial civilian population within the British Army and 
its role in the larger war for America by examining the dual tenures of Major General 
James Pattison as Commandant of the Royal Artillery in North America between 
September 24, 1777 and September 4, 1780 and Commandant of the City and Garrison of 
New York from July 5, 1779 to August 13, 1780.1  As the garrison commandant, Pattison 
was a “middle manager” tasked with translating the strategic guidance of Britain’s 
Colonial Office and their military superiors into executable plans.2  He functioned as an 
                                                            
1British officials used the terms commandant and commander interchangeably.  This paper will 
distinguish the position of leadership for a military organization as “commander,” while commandant will 
refer to the civil‐military position associated with the occupation of New York City.  
 
2Paul Kennedy, "History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War," Journal of Military 
History 74, no. 1 (2010): 35‐36. 
2 
 
indispensible negotiator between the British Army Headquarters, which was located in 
New York City throughout most of the occupation, and the civilians who forfeited their 
customary English liberties under martial law in exchange for the safety of the garrison.3  
The commandants’ hybrid civil-military position demanded that Pattison delicately 
balance the needs of the army with the burdens that meeting those needs imposed upon 
the city’s inhabitants.  He perpetually squared the short-term gains to military readiness 
by requisitioning food, wagons, horses, billets, and firewood against the long-term 
consequences of alienating the local populace.4  This suggests the commandant’s unique 
requirements and responsibilities helped shape Pattison’s ability to mobilize the military 
potential of the city’s populace.  Well before his fellow officers Pattison realized that 
victory in America required both battlefield success and effective governance; therefore, 
he crafted policies that were designed to conciliate the civilian population within the city.  
Pattison’s tenure represented the apex of relations between the British forces stationed 
within New York City and the local populace as demonstrated by the unprecedented 
mobilization of nearly 6,000 Loyalist troops during the winter of 1779/1780.5 
                                                            
3 See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Civilians under Military Justice: The British Practice since 1689, 
Especially in North America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 95‐107 for the exercise of martial 
law in New York City during the British occupation.  For Commandant James Robertson’s efforts to 
reinstate civil government as the newly appointed Governor of New York see James Robertson, The 
Twilight of British Rule in Revolutionary America: The New York Letter Book of General James Robertson, 
1780‐1783, ed. Ronald W. Howard and Milton M. Klein (Cooperstown, NY: New York State Historical 
Association, 1983) (cited hereafter as Twilight of British Rule). 
 
4 For city inhabitants’ reactions to the occupation see Thomas Jones, History of New York During 
the Revolutionary War, ed. Edward F. De Lancey, 2 vols., Eyewitness Accounts of the American Revolution, 
vol. 1 (New York: The New York Times & Arno Press, Inc. , 1968); Ewald Gustav Schaukirk, "Occupation of 
New York City by the British," The Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography 10, no. 4 
(1887);William Smith, Historical Memoirs ... Of William Smith, ed. William Henry Waldo Sabine (New York: 
New York Times, 1969). 
 
5 Robertson, The Twilight of British Rule, 106. 
3 
Examining Pattison’s experiences in North America provides a lens into three key 
aspects of the American War of Independence.  First, through him, one gains a clearer 
picture of the relatively unstudied problem of British military policy towards urban areas 
during the war. Although there are a number of monographs that examine British Army 
units in cities prior to the outbreak of hostilities, and some that chronicle the occupation 
of America’s major cities during the war, none examines the question from a British 
Army institutional perspective.6  Second, Pattison’s responsibilities as both the 
Commandant of the Royal Artillery and the Commandant of the City and Garrison of 
New York demonstrate how competing institutional goals shaped the implementation of 
policy within the colonies.  Third, his success in raising Loyalist militia belies the notion 
that the British strategy to use Loyalists in Britain’s pacification efforts was quixotic, and 
                                                            
6 Regarding the prewar tensions and Americans’ alienation from the British Empire see John W. 
Shy, Toward Lexington: The Role of the British Army in the Coming of the American Revolution (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1965); Fred Anderson, A People's Army : Massachusetts Soldiers and 
Society in the Seven Years' War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Douglas Edward 
Leach, Roots of Conflict : British Armed Forces and Colonial Americans, 1677‐1763 (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 1986); Fred. Anderson, Crucible of War : The Seven Years' War and the Fate of 
Empire in British North America, 1754‐1766, 1st ed. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2000); and Richard 
Archer, As If an Enemy's Country : The British Occupation of Boston and the Origins of Revolution (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010).  For conditions in occupied cities prior to and during the American 
Revolution see Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible : The Northern Seaports and the Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986); Jacqueline Barbara Carr, After the Siege : A 
Social History of Boston 1775‐1800 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 2005); George Smith 
McCowen, The British Occupation of Charleston, 1780‐82 (Columbia: Published for the South Carolina 
Tricentennial Commission by the University of South Carolina Press, 1972); Benjamin L. Carp, Rebels 
Rising: Cities and the American Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).  For New York City 
during the British occupation see Oscar Theodore Barck Jr., New York City During the War for 
Independence: With Special Reference to the Period of British Occupation, Studies in History, Economics, 
and Public Law; No. 357 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1931); Wilbur Cortez Abbott, New York in 
the American Revolution (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1929); Thomas Jefferson Wertenbaker, Father 
Knickerbocker Rebels: New York City During the Revolution (New York: C. Scribner's Sons, 1948); Barnet 
Schecter, The Battle for New York : The City at the Heart of the American Revolution (New York: Walker & 
Co., 2002); Judith L. Van Buskirk, Generous Enemies : Patriots and Loyalists in Revolutionary New York 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002); and Phillip Papas, That Ever Loyal Island : Staten 
Island and the American Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 2007). 
 
4 
provides an important corrective to the common view that the British only made large-
scale efforts to raise Loyalist militia as part of their “southern strategy.”7    
As commandant, Pattison was placed in the unique position of being beholden to 
two separate chains of command because the job of garrison commandant was an 
additional duty.  Pattison’s primary military duty, from his arrival in New York in 1777 
until he departed in 1780, was commander of the Royal Artillery in America.  In this 
capacity he was expected to lead the Royal Artillery on campaign when the main British 
Army took the field.  He was also required to maintain the Royal Artillery’s combat 
readiness by overseeing all of the logistical, disciplinary, and personnel issues for the 
units stationed in North America. In this capacity he reported to the Board of Ordnance.  
Pattison’s main military responsibility as commandant, on the other hand, was securing 
New York City and its surrounding environs – Manhattan, Staten Island, Long Island, 
and Paulus Hook - from both external and internal threats.   
The threats were numerous and varied.  So-called whaleboat wars, named for the 
vessels employed, posed the most common external threat and resulted in endemic 
amphibious raiding against Britain’s island strongholds.  Despite the frequency of these 
attacks, they never represented a serious challenge to Britain’s position in New York.  
After France’s official entry into the war in 1778, however, there were a number of 
instances when the French fleet appeared in American waters and threatened to blockade 
New York while the Continental Army simultaneously laid siege to the city.  Although a 
joint Franco-American amphibious assault against the city never took place, it remained 
                                                            
7 Paul Hubert Smith, Loyalists and Redcoats: A Study in British Revolutionary Policy (Chapel Hill,: 
Published for the Institute of Early American History and Culture at Williamsburg, Va., 1964); Wallace 
Brown, The Good Americans; the Loyalists in the American Revolution (New York: Morrow, 1969); Robert 
M. Calhoon, The Loyalists in Revolutionary America, 1760‐1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1973). 
5 
the greatest military danger after 1778, a danger of which Pattison had to remain wary.  
Internal threats, meanwhile, largely came from spies and saboteurs.  Two days after the 
British seized the city a conflagration broke out that consumed nearly 600 buildings.  
Although there are conflicting accounts of how the inferno started, the most reliable ones 
attribute it to Patriot arsonists.8  Pattison became commandant well after that event, but it 
clearly remained a concern as evidenced by Pattison’s regulations regarding the storage 
of “combustible naval stores,” the fines imposed on inhabitants who did not regularly 
sweep their chimneys, or his approval of a lottery to raise funds for fire buckets.9 
Pattison did not have a free hand in executing his assigned tasks of running the 
Royal Artillery and defending New York City.  The organizational hierarchy and 
administrative peculiarities of the British Army and Royal Artillery placed constraints 
upon his options.  However, the ambiguity of British conceptions regarding the proper 
role of a commandant provided Pattison with room to exercise his own initiative.  These 
two structural dynamics shaped Pattison’s experience and explain his unmatched success 
in raising Loyalist militia within New York City. 
                                                            
8Benjamin L. Carp, "The Night the Yankees Burned Broadway: The New York City Fire of 1776," 
Early American Studies 4, no. 2 ( 2006): 471‐511. 
 
9 Carson I. Ritchie, "A New York Diary of the Revolutionary War," New York Historical Society 
Quarterly 50, no. 3 (1966)., 431.  Pattison issued an order to remove all turpentine, tar, resin etc. to a 
communal spot to prevent fire on July 27, 1779, but it was not published until the following week on 
August 3, 1779 in The New‐York Gazette and Weekly Mercury; The James Pattison Papers, 1777‐1781, 
November 12, 1778, microfilm.  Pattison reissued Lieutenant General Daniel Jones’s order that all 
chimneys be swept once every four weeks and that fire resulting from neglect would carry a £5 fine; The 
New York Gazette and Weekly Mercury, July 10, 1780, 4.  Pattison authorized a lottery expected to raise 
$3,600 for the purchase of fire buckets. 
6 
	
Structure	of	the	British	Army	and	Royal	Artillery	
 
Britain’s decisive victory over France and Spain during the Seven Years’ War 
(1756-1763) made it the preeminent European imperial power.  Despite the unparalleled 
success of British arms and numerous reform initiatives in the wake of its victory, by the 
beginning of the American War of Independence Britain’s military establishment 
remained a bloated, bureaucratic labyrinth that lacked centralized control.  Thomas 
Hutchinson, the former Royal Governor of Massachusetts, commented in 1776 that the 
inability of the numerous government agencies, both civil and military, to coordinate 
their activities “shows the want of one great director to keep every part of the operations 
of government constantly in his head.”10 
Theoretically all military authority at this time derived from King George III (r. 
1760-1820), but Parliament’s increasing presence in the administration of government 
created a de facto dual chain of command, one operational and the other administrative.  
The constitutional settlement of the Glorious Revolution of 1688/1689 planted the seeds 
of this dual command structure.  Parliament’s passage of the Mutiny Act gave King 
William III the power to discipline disobedient troops by extending the jurisdiction of 
military justice to peacetime.11  The new act also limited the size of the standing army.  
Parliament did this by annually appropriating just enough funding to cover the number of 
                                                            
10 Quoted in Piers Mackesy, The War for America, 1775‐1783 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1964), 20 (hereafter cited as War for America). 
 
11H. C. B. Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century (New York: Hippocrene Books, 
1977), 39. 
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troops they had approved.12  Parliament sought to prevent a military dictatorship by 
reining in Royal Prerogative while simultaneously expanding its own powers.13   
In addition to its annual control of army funding, Parliament also divided 
responsibilities within the military in a way that served to restrain the potential power of 
any one element.  Parliament separated the combat forces into the British Army, Royal 
Navy, and Royal Artillery.  Although this functional division was logical, it was 
inefficient because it created massive duplication of effort among the services with each 
developing its own support agencies instead of relying on consolidated ones.  Three 
distinct government agencies supplied the armed forces and four more governmental 
departments were responsible for transporting those supplies.  The Treasury supplied 
both provisions and equipment to the British Army, the Navy Board was responsible for 
building and outfitting ships, while the Board of Ordnance issued weapons to both 
services.  A fourth agency, the Royal Navy’s Victualing Board, provided foodstuffs to the 
fleets.  All of these departments independently contracted shipping which led to frequent 
competition over merchant vessels to transport supplies.14 
The military forces were further broken down along geographical lines by the 
existence of the Irish and English establishments within the army and numerous fleets 
throughout the world.  The British Army also created regional commands in Britain’s 
colonial possessions.  When Lieutenant General Sir Henry Clinton took command of the 
war effort in America he inherited the title of, “Our General and Commander-in-Chief of 
                                                            
12Edward Curtis, The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1926), 33 (hereafter cited as Organization of the British Army). 
 
13 Royal Prerogative refers to the customary powers and privileges intrinsic to the royal 
sovereign, king or queen, within a monarchical government. 
14Mackesy, War for America, 16. 
 
8 
Our Forces in Our Colonies in North America lying on the Atlantic Ocean, from Nova 
Scotia on the North to West Florida on the South, both inclusive.”15 
Most important for operational control, however, was the geographic delineation 
of authority for the Secretaries of State.  The Secretary of State for the Northern 
Department dealt with matters concerning the predominantly Protestant continental 
powers of Europe, while the Secretary of State for the Southern Department concerned 
himself with issues throughout the Mediterranean basin.  As one of their post-war 
reforms, in 1768 the British created a new position, the Secretary of State for America 
and the West Indies, to oversee affairs in the western hemisphere.16 
The Cabinet and the Secretaries of State were the two most important offices in 
the operational chain-of-command for Britain’s ponderous war machine, with the former 
responsible for planning and the latter tasked with carrying out the Cabinet’s plans.  Sir 
Charles Middleton, the Tory Member of Parliament (MP) for Rochester, summed up their 
respective duties thusly:  
Cabinet. To consider and determine what expeditions are to take place, and  
at what periods; what troops are likely to be sent abroad, when, where, how,  
and the number.  What services are to have preference.   
Secretary of State. To issue timely orders, to the Treasury, Admiralty,  
Ordnance, and Commander-in-Chief of the Army on these heads, so that every 
necessary preparation can be made, and no delay nor disappointment happen  
when the services take place.17 
 
                                                            
15 King George III to CINC [Commander‐in‐Chief], March 19, 1778, Sir Henry Clinton Papers, 
Volume 32:20, William L. Clements Library, Ann Arbor, MI. 
16David Ascoli, A Companion to the British Army, 1660‐1983 (London: Harrap, 1983), 298. 
 
17Quoted in Mackesy, The War for America, 12.  Between 1775 and 1783 the Cabinet consisted of 
the following nine positions: First Lord of the Treasury, three Secretaries of States (Northern Department, 
Southern Department, and American Colonies), First Lord of the Admiralty, Commander‐in‐Chief, Lord 
President of the Council, Lord Privy Seal, Lord Chancellor, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, Master‐General of the Ordnance, and Lord Steward of the Household. 
 
9 
All of these officials, whether Cabinet members or Secretaries of State, were 
simultaneously MPs in either the House of Commons or the House of Lords.  This 
plurality of office holding extended to military leaders, many of whom were MPs, and 
some of whom served in the Cabinet as well.18  In theory the King made strategic 
decisions based on the advice of his Privy Council and his senior military officials.  This 
strategic guidance was forwarded to the remainder of the Cabinet where it was translated 
into generalized campaign plans.  The Cabinet then communicated its plans to the 
respective Secretaries of State to coordinate among the affected governmental 
departments and manage the innumerable problems that arose.  Secretaries of State in 
general and Lord George Germain, the American Secretary from 1775 to 1782, in 
particular, sent orders directly to military commanders operating in the theaters under 
their jurisdiction.  The inclusion of the Secretaries of State in the Cabinet gave them 
influence over both the planning and execution phases of campaigns which provided the 
sole source of continuity for Britain’s military operations.   
 The army’s administrative chain-of-command also began with the monarch.  
However, common practice dictated that His Majesty delegate his military authority to a 
Commander-in-Chief with the rank of Captain General to provide administrative 
oversight.19  This post was vacant at the beginning of the American War of Independence 
and was not filled until 1778 when open war with France prompted George III to appoint 
Sir Jeffrey Amherst.  Despite becoming the highest-ranking officer in the British Army, 
Amherst could not issue any orders to the commanders in America as his authority was 
                                                            
18Conspicuous British military leaders during the American Revolution who held seats in 
Parliament included generals William Howe, John Burgoyne, Henry Clinton, and Charles Cornwallis as well 
as Admiral Richard Howe. 
19 The rank of Captain General is usually shortened to General.   
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geographically limited to England, Scotland, and Wales.20  The absence of a 
Commander-in-Chief during the first three years of the war greatly enhanced the powers 
of the War Office headed by the sitting Secretary at War William Wildman Shute 
Barrington, 2nd Viscount Barrington, because Barrington had to assume many of the 
Commander-in-Chief’s duties to meet wartime exigencies.  Viscount Barrington not only 
drafted the articles of war and published the army lists, but he also issued all orders 
pertaining to finance to the paymaster general.  Furthermore, he approved all 
organizational changes to the army and personnel actions, maintained all service records, 
and supervised all military hospitals, courts-martial, and mercenaries in British service.  
His authority, like that of the Commander-in-Chief, was limited geographically to 
England, Scotland, and Wales and functionally to the horse and foot regiments because 
the artillery and engineers fell under the Master-General of the Ordnance.21 
 The Royal Artillery, which consisted of both artillerymen and engineers, was born 
on July 15, 1683 when Orders in Council established the organization and created the 
position of Master Gunner.  The Master Gunner commanded sixty-three artillerymen and 
was responsible for keeping a register of his forces and providing them with instruction in 
shooting.  In 1702 the Duke of Marlborough altered the position of Master Gunner by 
renaming it the Master-General of the Ordnance and placing it at the head of a Board of 
Ordnance.  The Board of Ordnance was a five-member body consisting of a lieutenant 
general, surveyor-general, clerk of the ordnance, keeper of the stores, and clerk of the 
deliveries.  Unlike the other positions on the Board of Ordnance, the Lieutenant General 
was a purely military appointment devoid of any associated Parliamentary political 
                                                            
20Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, 34. 
21Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 34‐35. 
 
11 
office, yet a prestigious one at that.  The Lieutenant General served as the Master-
General’s deputy, and during periods when the British Army’s Commander-in-Chief 
posting sat vacant, the Lieutenant General of the Ordnance became the highest 
professional post an army officer could hold.22  The Royal Artillery was initially a 
civilian department whose officers did not receive military commissions.  This changed 
with a royal warrant in 1742 that created the first Royal Regiment of Artillery consisting 
of six companies.  By 1751 the officers received commissions with rank commensurate to 
that of the British Army. 
 Thus in some ways a “junior service,” dominated by the line regiments of the 
army, the Royal Artillery nevertheless set a standard of professionalism among its officer 
corps unmatched by the British Army in general.  Lieutenant General James Pattison’s 
career exemplifies both its distinctiveness and its blending into the army. Pattison joined 
the Royal Regiment of Artillery in 1740 at the age of seventeen.  The Royal Artillery’s 
policy of commissioning officers based on technical competence instead of selling 
commissions to the highest bidder greatly increased the size of its recruiting pool by 
opening it to the middle class.  Not surprisingly, this permitted it to be more selective, 
thus increasing the quality of recruits.  From 1741, when the Royal Military Academy 
was founded at Woolwich, all officers received a professional education in mathematics 
and fortification techniques.  Pattison was, therefore, part of the first generation of trained 
artillery officers.  Matching his technical competence, Pattison demonstrated an acute 
political acumen when he married one of Colonel Albert Borgard’s daughters.  Colonel 
Borgard had established the Royal Artillery and served as its first commander.  Pattison 
first went on campaign in Ghent, Belgium during 1742 and saw further action during the 
                                                            
22Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, 36. 
12 
Seven Years’ War in Portugal.  Based on his wartime record the Royal Artillery selected 
him to organize Venice’s artillery in 1769.  Although Pattison advanced steadily through 
the ranks due to his connections and skill, it took him thirty-seven years to gain command 
of a regiment.  He finally achieved this milestone in 1777 when he assumed command of 
the 4th Battalion upon the death of Colonel Ord.23 
 The regimental system was the organizational bedrock of the British military 
during the eighteenth century.  The terms regiment and battalion were synonymous 
during the American War of Independence because the infantry numerically dominated 
the British Army and that branch only assigned one battalion to each regiment with the 
exception of the 1st and 60th Regiments which both had two battalions.  The regiment 
was technically the administrative side of the organization while the battalion was the 
tactical one.  The typical English infantry regiment/battalion consisted of 477 men in ten 
companies.  Eight of the companies were “battalion companies” composed of regular 
infantrymen.  There were also two elite “flank companies,” one of grenadiers and the 
other light infantry. The Royal Artillery’s structure differed from the infantry given its 
unique mission and requirements.  There was only one Royal Artillery Regiment, but it 
had four large battalions attached to it.  Each Royal Artillery Battalion consisted of eight 
companies prior to 1779, and ten companies thereafter for a total strength of 928 and 
1160 men respectively.24  Artillery companies were twice as large as infantry companies 
because of the manpower-intensive nature of transporting and manning the cannons. 
By assuming command of the 4th Royal Artillery Battalion Pattison secured a 
revenue generating post and a position of patronage, while firmly establishing himself 
                                                            
23I.F. Burton, "James Pattison (C. 1723‐1805), " The James Pattison Papers, 1777‐1781, microfilm. 
24 Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 4‐7. 
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within the military hierarchy.  While the British military bureaucracy treated regiments as 
their commanders’ personal property, the bureaucracy exercised oversight through 
financial and reputational incentives.  The King did not sell regimental colonels their 
commissions.  These were bestowed upon them for free as a way of harnessing the 
political influence of notable subjects to help raise troops.  This system tapped the 
regimental colonels’ political and financial resources because although Parliament 
appropriated funds to raise the new regiment they were seldom adequate to cover all the 
costs of recruiting and equipping the men.  The colonel had to cover the difference.25  
One way that the regimental colonel recouped his initial outlays was by selling the 
commissions for all of the officer positions in his regiment upon its creation.  However, 
the regimental colonel only got paid for the initial commission.  Once purchased, the 
commissions, ranging from Lieutenant Colonel to Ensign, became the personal property 
of their officers who were free to sell them to their successors.  Unlike infantry 
regimental commanders, who could sell commissions within their regiment that cost 
anywhere from £400 for an ensigncy to £6,700 for a lieutenant colonelcy in the infantry 
and cavalry, artillery commanders could not offset the costs of creating a new battalion 
with the fees paid for the officers’ commissions.26  Fortunately for Pattison, since the 4th 
Battalion was already in existence, he did not have to absorb the normal start-up costs.   
Despite these peculiarities, regimental command could still be a profitable 
venture, as it was for Pattison.27  The fiduciary benefits derived from keeping the unit up 
                                                            
25 Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, 45. 
 
26Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 160. 
 
27 Most infantry and cavalry regiments only had one battalion while some had two, but the Royal 
Artillery Regiment had four battalions.   
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to its full strength and efficiently managing the soldiers’ pay.  The colonel’s annual salary 
of £803 was his only guaranteed income during peacetime, but wartime service offered 
pay as a general and opportunities to skim a little extra from the war chests.28  The 4th 
Battalion had eight companies assigned to it for a total authorized strength of 928 men 
when Pattison took command.29  Pattison, like all colonels, received payment from the 
treasury for all of the soldiers and civilian wagon drivers he documented on his muster 
rolls.  Payment for the troops came in two forms: subsistence and gross off-reckoning 
pay.  Of the privates’ daily wages of eight pence, six pence went to subsistence pay and 
the other two pence to gross off-reckoning pay.  Subsistence pay covered provisions and 
officers often diverted it to cover other miscellaneous expenses such as clothing and 
weapons repair.  The off-reckoning pay contributed to the Chelsea Hospital fund and the 
regimental agent who handled the finances.  Whatever was left over was known as the 
“net off-reckonings” which was supposed to go towards soldiers’ clothing, but frequently 
served as a slush fund for the battalion commander.  The British Treasury also permitted 
military units to keep six empty placeholders on their muster roles to compensate the 
colonel for the clothing lost to deserters and provide a recruitment fund.30 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
 
28Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 159. 
29Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 6. In 1779, Parliament authorized artillery battalions to 
increase by two more companies, for a total strength of 1160 men.  However, this reform was not 
implemented in the 4th Battalion until after the American War of Independence. 
 
30Rogers, The British Army of the Eighteenth Century, 46; Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 
22‐24.  During the American Revolution £1 = 20 shillings and 1 shilling = 12 pence.  The average soldier 
technically made £12, 3 shillings, 4 pence during the year but saw precious little of that money. 
15 
	
Commandants:	Their	Myriad	Meanings	and	Duties	
 
Until the summer of 1779 Pattison’s experiences in America had been defined by 
his role in the Royal Artillery and the various campaigns he participated in, most notably 
the occupation of Philadelphia on September 26, 1777 and the capture of Stony Point on 
the night of May 31/June 1, 1779.  Shortly thereafter, on July 5, 1779, Clinton tapped him 
to assume the role of commandant of New York City.  In his new position as 
commandant, Pattison assumed complex and sometimes contradictory responsibilities.  
The term commandant usually denoted a commander of a military unit or a location.  The 
commandants who commanded cities with substantial civilian populations were 
sometimes referred to as governors.  They functioned as “mid-level managers of war” 
who were responsible for translating strategic guidance from multiple military and 
civilian superiors into policies and executable orders.31 
 French and British eighteenth-century military treatises clearly demonstrate the 
conceptual developments associated with the roles and functions of commandants.  
Historian Ira Gruber’s investigation of what books British officers of the Revolutionary 
era owned or referenced revealed a lively professional interest in technical military 
treatises, with a special interest (after the 1740s) in those produced by French authors.  
Particularly popular were:  Lieutenant General Feuquières’s Memoirs (1737), Marshal 
Turenne’s Military Memoirs and Maxims (1744), Marshal Saxe’s Reveries; or Memoirs 
                                                            
31Paul Kennedy, "History from the Middle: The Case of the Second World War," Journal of 
Military History 74, no. 1 (2010): 1. 
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Concerning the Art of War (1759), and Turpin de Crissé’s An Essay on the Art of War 
(1761).32 
By the time of the American Revolution British military treatises generically 
defined the word commandant as “that person who has the command of a garrison, fort, 
castle, regiment, company, &c."33  The term was used interchangeably with the word 
commander in military organizations of the time.  Turpin de Crissé’s An Essay on the Art 
of War used commandant in lieu of commander throughout the text referring, for 
example, to the “commandant of escort,” “commandant of the detachment,” and 
“commandant of the guard.”34  While Saxe also used the term in this fashion citing 
“commandants of battalions,” he distinguished between commanders in charge of 
military units and those responsible for a fortress calling the latter “commandant of the 
citadel.”35  In The Military Guide for Young Officers (1776), Englishman Thomas Simes 
quoted the Duke of Cumberland’s regulations that used the term “Commandant of a 
                                                            
32Ira D. Gruber, Books and the British Army in the Age of the American Revolution (Chapel Hill and 
Washington, D.C.): University of North Carolina Press; Copublished with the Society of the Cincinnati, 
2010), 279.  Gruber looked at the libraries of 42 British officers to identify the works that they considered 
authoritative.  They appeared in 268 editions and seven languages, so the publication dates above 
correlate to the most popular English editions.  
 
33Capt. George Smith, An Universal Military Dictionary, a Copious Explanation of the Technical 
Terms &C. Used in the Equipment, Machinery, Movements, and Military Operations of an Army (London: J. 
Millan, 1779). 
 
`  34Turpin de Crissé, An Essay on the Art of War trans., Captain Joseph Otway, 2 vols., vol. 1 
(London: A. Hamilton, 1761), 170, 196; Turpin de Crissé, An Essay on the Art of War, trans., Captain Joseph 
Otway, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London: A. Hamilton, 1761), 31 (hereafter cited as Essay on the Art of War). 
 
35Maurice Saxe, comte de, Reveries, or, Memoirs Concerning the Art of War. By Maurice Count De 
Saxe, Marshal‐General of the Armies of France. To Which Is Annexed, His Treatise Concerning Legions; or, 
a Plan for New‐Modelling the French Armies. Illustrated with Copper‐Plates. Together with Letters on 
Various Military Subjects, Wrote by the Marshal to Several Eminent Persons; and, the Author's Reflections 
on the Propagation of the Human Species. Translated from the French. To Which Is Prefixed an Account of 
the Life of the Author. (Edinburgh: Sands, Donaldson, Murray, and Cochran. For Alexander Donaldson, at 
Pope's Head, MDCCLIX [1759]. ) (cited hereafter as Reveries, or, Memoirs Concerning the Art of War). 
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town.”36  Finally, Major Robert Donkin’s Military Collections and Remarks (1777) also 
used the word commandant interchangeably with commander.37 
Vagaries of terminology aside, it was clear that the “commandant” of a city, 
among other things, was first and foremost the commander of that city’s garrison.  
Whatever power he had to control the city’s population and enforce his edicts depended 
on the men in his garrison.  Captain George Smith’s Universal Military Dictionary 
succinctly explained a garrison as:   
…a body of forces, disposed in a fortress or garrison town, to defend it  
against the enemy, or to keep the inhabitants in subjection; or even to be 
subsisted during the winter season: hence garrison and winter-quarters  
are sometimes used indifferently, for the same thing; and sometimes they  
denote different things. In the latter case, a garrison is a place wherein  
forces are maintained to secure it, and where they keep regular guard, as  
a frontier town, a citadel, castle, tower, &c.  The garrison should always  
be stronger than the townsmen.38 
 
Smith thus asserted that the primary responsibilities of the garrison commandant were to 
defend the fortified location against attacks by the enemy, to control the civilian 
population, and to protect the army’s magazines.39  This definition of a garrison and its 
functions remained nearly identical to the one Feuquière advanced forty years before.40 
                                                            
36Thomas Simes, The Military Guide for the Young Officer, Containing a System of the Art of War; 
Parade, Camp, Field Duty; Manoeuvers, Standing and General Orders; Warrants, Regulations, Returns; 
Tables, Forms, Extracts from Military Acts; Battles, Sieges, Forts, Ports, Military Dictionary, &C. With 
Twenty‐Five Maps and Copper Plates. By Thomas Simes, Esq. Aothor of the Military Medley. The Second 
Edition, with the Addition of the Regulations of H.R.H. The Late Duke of Cumberland, &C. In Germany and 
Scotland. (London: J. Millen, 1776). 60 (cited hereafter as Military Guide for the Young Officer). 
37Robert Donkin, "Military Collections and Remarks. [Three Lines from Tortenson] Published by Major 
Donkin.," (New‐York: H. Gaine, M,DCC,LXX,VII. [1777]), 235, 249, 253.   
38Smith. Universal Military Dictionary, s.v. “Garrison.”  Other pertinent definitions from Smith: 
Winter‐quarters signifies a place where a number of forces are laid up in the winter season, without 
keeping the regular guard. Garrison‐town, generally a strong place in which troops are quartered, and do 
duty, for the security thereof, keeping strong guards at each port, and a man‐guard in or near the market‐
place. 
 
39Smith, Universal Military Dictionary, s.v. “Magazine.”  A place in which stores are kept, or arms, 
ammunition, provisions, &c. Every fortified town ought to be furnished with a large magazine, which 
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 Generally speaking officers of the ancien régime were both apprehensive and 
contemptuous of having civilians in their midst during wartime.  They feared that the 
city’s inhabitants would either undermine the city’s defenses through treachery or 
provide intelligence to a besieging army.  Feuquière recounted a siege from 1672 when 
the inhabitants of the Bavarian city of Groll forced the garrison to surrender by setting the 
city ablaze when the attackers began their assault.41  Turenne likewise noted resistance 
from civilian populations.  He attributed it to their fickle nature, writing “The populace, 
who are easily raised into a rebellion, and little addicted to like the best rulers,” therefore 
it was necessary to build a citadel within the city, not to defend against external attack, 
but rather “to hinder the inhabitants from revolting against the garrison, who may not be 
safe among a numerous and ill-disposed people.”42  Turpin de Crissé warned, “the 
inhabitants are always to be feared, as they are naturally more attached to their old 
sovereigns than their conquerors,” while Donkin emphasized the populace’s ability to act 
a fifth column.43 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
should contain stores of all kinds, sufficient to enable the garrison and inhabitants to hold out a long 
siege, and in which smiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, &c. may be employed in making every thing 
belonging to the artillery, as carriages, wagons, &c. 
40Marquis Feuquière, Memoirs of the Late Marquis De Feuquiere, Lieutenant General of the 
French Army. Written for the Instruction of His Son. Being an Account of All the Wars in Europe, from the 
Year 1672, to the Year 1710. In Which Is Given a Curious Relation of the Sieges Undertaken, and Battles 
Fought, in That Period of Time., 2 vols., vol. 2 (London: Printed for T. WOODWARD, at the HalfMoon in 
Fleet‐street. and C. DAVIS. In Pater‐noster Row. , MDCCXXXVlI). Glossary, GAL – GAT (cited hereafter as 
Memoirs of Feuquiere). 
41 Feuquière, Memoirs of Feuquiere, 266. 
 
42 Major‐General A.l. Williamson, Military Memoirs and Maxims of Marshal Turenne Interspersed 
with Others, Taken from the Best Authors, and Observation, with Remarks (London: Printed for J. and P. 
Knapton, at the Crown in Ludgate‐Street, 1744), 108 (cited hereafter as Memoirs of Marshal Turenne). 
 
43Crissé, Essay on the Art of War, 4; Donkin, 263. 
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All of the military authors noted the potential role city dwellers could play 
regarding intelligence.  While most of them stressed the danger clandestine activity 
would pose to the garrison, some viewed it as an opportunity to learn about or deceive 
their enemies.  Turpin de Crissé recommended going into the surrounding countryside 
and rounding up “principal inhabitants, if they can secure them by means of whom he 
will be able, to gain information of the enemy, whether he is in detachment or in full 
force, whether he has been at the village and by what road he marches.”44 
 The presence of a large civilian population made these military garrison 
commanders institutionally unique because they had to perform both military and civil 
functions.  The hybrid civil-military character of their positions divided military opinion 
on what to call them.  The French most often referred to them as governors while the 
British alternated between governor and commandant.  Feuquière defined a governor as,  
a very considerable Officer, and has a great Trust reposed in him, and  
ought to be very vigilant and brave.  His Charge is to order the Guards, 
the Rounds, and the Patrouilles, to give every Night the Orders and the  
Word, after the gates are shut, to visit the Posts, to see that both Officers  
and Soldiers do their Duties, and to send frequently Parties abroad for  
Intelligence, and to raise Contribution.45 
 
This definition focused almost exclusively on military duties and epitomized what 
Feuquière was thinking when he discussed a “Governour of the Citadel.”46  Turenne 
advised that the town and the citadel should have two separate governors and that the 
military governor should be independent of the civil one.47  The French writers agreed 
                                                            
44 Crissé, Essay on the Art of War, 40. 
 
45 Feuquière, Memoirs of Feuquiere, Appendix, GOR – GRE. 
 
46 Feuquiere, Memoirs of Feuquiere, 343. 
 
47 Williamson, Memoirs of Marshal Turenne, 108. 
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that the governor’s responsibilities included the security of the post and the care and 
discipline of the garrison.  However, they disagreed, on how the governor should treat the 
inhabitants.  Turenne advocated a policy of fear, writing: “You let them all know, that if 
they meditate a revolt, you’ll set fire to the four corners of the town, and cut off every 
man of them.”48  Turpin de Crissé, writing a generation later, on the other hand, 
recommended kind treatment for the city’s inhabitants and stressed the need to discipline 
the soldiers to prevent abuses amongst the civilian population. 
If the mid-century French authors conveyed mixed messages, the British military 
texts of the 1770s clearly distinguished between civil governors and military 
commandants despite the similarities of their defensive responsibilities during hostilities.  
Civil governors were theoretically the ultimate authority in their towns because “a 
commission of Governor creates him [the governor], in a manner, Captain-general in his 
own town” similar to the military authority that the King held over the entire nation.  In 
reality, however, disputes often broke out between civil governors and military 
commandants over the extent of one another’s authorities because military commanders 
often held equivalent or superior rank to local governors.49  One way to solve this 
problem was to spell out the respective jurisdictions of these officials, but that seldom 
occurred in practice.  Donkin argued that the weakness of civil governors encouraged the 
spread of the rebellion during the American War of Independence and strongly advocated 
for military governors who could immediately address local disturbances.  British 
military authors at this time also widely endorsed the benevolent treatment of civilians 
                                                            
48 Williamson, Memoirs of Marshal Turenne, 132. 
 
49Simes, Military Guide for the Young Officer, 106. 
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because "generous behaviour will so gain the hearts of the country people."50  Donkin’s 
views are particularly important because two of James Pattison’s close associates in the 
Royal Artillery, General Samuel Cleaveland and Captain Stephen Payne Adye, received 
copies of Military Collections and Remarks.51  Although we can never be sure of exactly 
what Pattison read, these ideas were clearly common currency in the service at the time, 
and would have been known in some form to Pattison and likely influenced his tenure as 
Commandant of New York City starting in July 1779. 
Commandant	of	the	Royal	Artillery	in	North	America	
 
When Pattison first left England for America in 1777, he took with him a 
commission for the local rank of brigadier general, the duty title of Commandant of the 
Royal Artillery in North America, his 4th Battalion headquarters staff, and a substantial 
reinforcement of artillery.52  Pattison’s responsibilities as the senior officer of the Royal 
Artillery were twofold: first, administratively he was to manage the force to maintain its 
combat readiness.  This required paying nearly interminable attention to matters 
                                                            
50Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, 229.; Young, Maneuvers, or Practical Observations 
on the Art of War quotes the following order from Major Wolfe at Stirling dated February 12, 1748: “The 
soldiers are to avoid all kind of disputes with the inhabitants; and if at any time there should happen any 
tumult or riot, they are by no means to mix with the people of the town, or to be concerned with them. 
The officer of the guard is to order a detachment to seize any men who disobey these orders, and to make 
them prisoners; and the serjeants and corporals are required to prevent so much as depends upon them 
all quarrels and disturbances. It is likewise ordered there be not the least subject of complaint in any of 
the quarters.” 
 
51Donkin, Military Collections and Remarks, listed under subscribers.  General Cleaveland served 
as the Commandant of the Royal Artillery in America prior to Pattison’s arrival.  Captain Adye served with 
Pattison in Portugal and became his aide during the War of Independence. 
 
52 Sir Henry Clinton promoted Pattison to Major General on January 26, 1780, but backdated the 
promotion effective date to May 20, 1777 for seniority purposes.  In Pattison’s title of “Commandant of 
the Royal Artillery in America,” the term commandant is synonymous with “commander.” 
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including personnel, supply, and pay, and thus making him beholden to the Master-
General and the Board of Ordnance.  Second, he was to support the local Commander-in-
Chief by commanding the Royal Artillery in the field during maneuvers by the whole 
army, or sending out detachments as appropriate for small scale operations and 
geographically isolated independent commands.  
   Brigadier General Pattison’s major administrative challenge was the 
transcontinental scope of his responsibilities.  During his tenure in North America he 
supervised twelve companies from three different Royal Artillery battalions.  These units 
were stationed along a nearly 1,500-mile expanse of territory running from Pensacola 
along the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian stronghold of Quebec on the Saint Lawrence 
River.53  Although eighteenth-century officers expected difficulties with their supply 
lines which would lead to occasional shortages, Pattison, the British Army, and the Royal 
Navy were all incensed by the shortages of artillery pieces and gunpowder in America.  
Although the three organizations seldom agreed, they all concurred that the Board of 
Ordnance bore culpability and castigated the agency as “obnoxious and obstructive” for 
its lackadaisical response to their requisitions.54  The Board of Ordnance’s failure to 
deliver cannons and gunpowder frequently forced Pattison to redistribute gunpowder and 
weapons among the garrisons in North America to prevent any one of his posts from 
becoming defenseless.  When the Royal Artillery company commander at Halifax, 
Captain Anthony Farrington, requested more gunpowder in December 1778 and January 
1779 without any other justification than “being in a great want of Powder” Pattison 
                                                            
53 Duncan, History of the Royal Regiment of Artillery,1:244.  All eight companies of the 4th 
Battalion served in America during Pattison’s tenure.  The 6th and 7th Companies of the 1st Battalion and 
the 1st and 6th Companies of the 3rd Battalion were also present. 
 
54 Curtis, Organization of the British Army, 41. 
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sprang into action despite his vexation.  He discovered from Halifax’s Ordnance 
Storekeeper that the unit only possessed seventy-four barrels of serviceable powder, 
which would barely allow the one hundred forty-one cannons and twenty-eight mortars to 
fire seven rounds each.  Pattison decided to dispatch an additional one hundred fifty 
barrels from the magazines in New York, but punctiliously reminded Captain Farrington 
that he should make all future requests to the Board of Ordnance.55 
Pattison’s deference to his military superiors and patrons clearly evinced his 
political acumen, but it did not inhibit his initiative to solve problems at the local level.  
When the Board of Ordnance failed to act on his frequent requests for artillery and 
gunpowder Pattison took matters into his own hands.  When New York City’s powder 
reserves dwindled to 958 barrels in August 1780, Pattison purchased an additional 500 
barrels that had been captured by British privateers and brought into the city for sale.  
Around the same time, Pattison purchased thirty Swedish 12-pounder cannons for new 
defensive works that had been constructed on Long Island.  In both instances Pattison 
provided himself with political cover by carefully noting Sir Henry Clinton’s approval of 
his acquisitions to the Board of Ordnance.  Thus the CINC legitimized Pattison’s actions 
and prevented the Board of Ordnance from taking any retribution against him.56 
 Pattison demonstrated his adaptability in mitigating the dearth of crucial supplies 
within the North American theater, but the issue of personnel management proved a far 
greater test of his leadership and political deftness.  He faced a myriad of challenges on 
                                                            
55 James Pattison, Official Letters of Major General James Pattison, Commandant of Artillery, 
Collections of the New‐York Historical Society, vol. 8 (New York: The Society, 1876).Official Letters of 
James Pattison, 3‐4 (hereafter cited as Official Letters of James Pattison). 
 
56Pattison, Official Letters of James Pattison, 195‐196. 
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that front, ranging from discontented junior officers to perpetually understrength units, 
about which his options proved rather limited. 
 The Royal Artillery company commanders in North America were predominantly 
captains.  Many of these young men chafed at the interminably lethargic rate of 
advancement for artillery officers during wartime when they saw the comparatively rapid 
advancement of infantry and cavalry officers.  One cause of this malaise was the Royal 
Artillery’s refusal to sell commissions; another was the relative safety of artillerists on 
the battlefield.  Their low mortality rate in combat failed to create the numerous 
vacancies needed for quick upward mobility.  By May 1779, artillery officers were 
forbidden from cross-commissioning into another branch to take advantage of their 
higher promotion opportunities.57  Although most officers took these structural 
impediments to promotion in stride, some challenged Pattison’s policies which they felt 
exacerbated the situation.  The first policy dealt with how Pattison determined seniority 
for filling vacancies when they did occur.  Instead of automatically selecting an officer 
from within a company to fill a vacant position, Pattison looked at the officers from all 
eight companies within the battalion, rank-ordered them in terms of seniority, and offered 
the position to the highest ranking potential replacement.  This made promotion even 
more competitive since officers would have to compete against at least six or as many as 
fourteen of their peers depending on the position.58  Pattison wrote to Captain George 
Rochfort, “As I make it a Rule for Promotions to go by Senior-ity in the Battalion, when 
accompanied with Merit, and not in the Company’s (except when detached at a great 
                                                            
57Pattison, Official Letters of James Pattison, 55. 
 
58 The typical artillery company had 1 Captain, 1 Captain Lieutenant, 2 First Lieutenants, and 2 
Second Lieutenants. 
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Distance) the Men you recommend cannot be advanced at present, there being [others 
with] much stronger Pretensions.”59 
The second sensitive issue regarded how Pattison awarded leaves of absence for 
officers to return to England to strengthen their patronage networks.  Captain William 
Johnstone, the Royal Artillery company commander in St. Augustine questioned the 
general on this point.  Pattison responded, “As to the Idea…of Officers endeavoring to 
get off their Commands, no such Applications, have ever been made to me consequently I 
cannot have granted the improper Indulgencies you allude to.”60  Pattison managed the 
requests of his subordinates who either pleaded illness or used their political connections 
to secure leave back in England as best he could because he was keenly aware of the 
negative impact that the numerous vacancies had upon his companies’ leadership.  
Nevertheless, in February 1779, at least four of Pattison’s other captains were 
simultaneously on convalescent leave in England.61 
As depleted as were the officer ranks of the Royal Artillery in North America, 
they appeared the picture of health when compared with the enlisted force.  The enlisted 
ranks were undermined by disease, desertion, corporal punishment, and combat.  In 
February 1779 the Royal Artillery battalions in America were short 280 soldiers.  Two 
months later that number jumped to 482.62  These were not unique challenges for a 
military organization during the eighteenth century, but there were a number of 
circumstances that aggravated the situation.  First, Pattison ignored customary procedure 
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when he brought the 4th Battalion Headquarters Staff to America.  Battalions traditionally 
left their headquarters staff in England to facilitate recruiting and diligently to settle 
accounts so that the unit received its pay in a timely fashion.  This mistake had significant 
ramifications for Pattison because it forced him to rely on Major General Samuel 
Cleaveland, Founder and Commandant of the Royal Military Repository, to oversee 
recruiting within the British Isles.  The results were less than satisfactory.  The foremost 
problem was the simple dearth of recruits who made it to America.  In March 1779 
Pattison thanked Cleaveland for his efforts, but pointed out that the arriving recruits only 
filled one-third of his vacancies.  Although Pattison was initially pragmatic about 
accepting Irish troops, noting, “As to the Recruiting in Ireland, I can only say, Necessity 
has no Law – I most certainly shou’d give the Preference to raising our men in England 
or Scotland if possible, but if that is not the case we must do the best we can.”  He soon 
changed his mind, however, referring to them as “Reptiles” prone to desert.63  Secondly, 
and this was inextricably linked to the lack of an organic support staff at Woolwich, the 
quality of the recruits who arrived was poor.  Ethnic biases aside, the men who arrived in 
America were not on the draft lists which led Pattison to conclude that the other 
battalions were siphoning off his best recruits and dumping their misfits on him.64  
Pattison sought to remedy these “friendly Difficulties” by sending Captain Congreve 
home convinced that "your Brother Officers, as well as myself will derive many 
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Advantages from having so faithful a Steward in England," but his presence made little 
difference.65 
General Pattison’s last major administrative duty as Commandant of the Royal 
Artillery in North America was to manage the organization’s finances.  In an era that 
considered graft an entitlement of office, Pattison’s criterion of “consistent with the Good 
of the Service” to justify all expenses made him an example of financial probity.66  He 
kept a close eye on all of the accounts and ensured that none of his officers received any 
pay they were not legitimately entitled to receive.  This was especially true of baggage 
and forage pay, which were meant to offset costs of active campaigning in the field.  
Nevertheless, numerous subordinate officers applied for this special duty pay while in 
garrison.  Pattison consistently turned them all down.  Another common ploy for soldiers 
to squeeze a few more pence out of Parliament’s purse strings was to hold multiple posts.  
While Pattison freely permitted his men to take on additional duties, he did not pay them 
for their actions without approval from the Board of Ordnance.  He was also diligent 
about only paying for transport ships when their service was indispensible and rescinded 
contracts as soon as the need had passed.   
Pattison’s administrative responsibilities for supplies, unit troop strengths, and 
expenditures all had the same goal in mind: to maintain a combat-ready force that could 
take the field with the main army on campaign or support independent actions with 
detachments as required by the Commander-in-Chief for North America.  Since 1776 
Britain had implemented a twofold military strategy designed to crush the American 
Revolution: first, it opted to wage a war of posts, coupled with a naval blockade, to choke 
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off vital war materiel needed by the Patriots; second, it sought to decisively defeat the 
Continental Army in a general action.    
The war of posts was a conventional strategy of eighteenth-century linear warfare 
designed to seize the enemy’s cities, supply magazines, and cut their lines of resupply 
and communication.67  Maurice Comte de Saxe, Marshal-General of the Armies of 
France from 1747 to 1750, explained the strengths of a war of posts, or guerre des postes, 
as follows: “They [fortresses] serve to cover a country; they oblige an enemy to attack 
them, before they can penetrate further; they afford a safe retreat and cover to your own 
troops on all occasions; they contain magazines, and form a secure receptacle, in the 
winter-time, for artillery, ammunition, &c.”68  The British adopted this cautious strategy 
because their experiences in Boston taught them that attrition management would be the 
key to their victory.  British Major General John Burgoyne astutely noted in the summer 
of 1775 that the American strategy should be to lose a battle every week to decimate the 
British Army, while Brigadier General Lord Hugh Percy wrote “our army is so small that 
we cannot even afford victory.”69  A war of posts would permit the British to 
methodically reclaim rebel territory while husbanding their resources in anticipation of an 
opportunity to strike a decisive blow.   
The Continental Army also rapidly came to understand the virtues of this 
approach.  Lieutenant General George Washington decided to adhere to this policy less 
than two weeks after his embarrassing defeat at the Battle of Long Island.  On September 
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8, 1776 he wrote, “on our Side the War should be defensive. It has even been called a 
War of Posts. That we should on all occasions avoid a general Action, or put anything to 
the risque, unless compelled by a necessity, into which we ought never to be drawn.”70  
Washington, however, adopted the strategy for significantly different reasons than the 
British.  He sought to use fortifications to bolster the fighting morale and effectiveness of 
his predominantly raw recruits to nullify the advantages of the British Regulars in open 
terrain.  Thus, although for different reasons and with different operational emphases, 
both sides remained dedicated to a war of posts for the vast majority of their conventional 
forces throughout the entire conflict.71 
Britain’s second strategy was to decisively defeat the Continental Army in a 
general action to demonstrate the futility of continued resistance.  Both of these 
strategies, the war of posts and a decisive general action, required the British to establish 
a formidable garrison in an American seaport: they chose New York City.  Despite 
defeating the Continental Army at Long Island, White Plains, capturing Fort Washington, 
and driving the remnants of the American army across New Jersey into Pennsylvania, the 
British Army failed to put down the rebellion in 1776.  Washington’s daring 
counterattacks on Trenton and Princeton at the close of 1776 and beginning of 1777 
demonstrated the fundamental flaw in the war of posts strategy for the British in such an 
extensive country.  The numerous garrisons required to secure New Jersey spread British 
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troops so thin that they could not resist a concentrated attack by the Americans.  
Furthermore, the British did not have enough soldiers to implement the strategy on 
colony-wide basis.  Nevertheless, the British adhered to the same one-two punch strategy 
of defensive fortifications and climactic battles the following year with plans to capture 
Philadelphia, Fort Ticonderoga, and Albany.  Lieutenant General Sir William Howe 
believed that threatening Philadelphia would force Washington to commit the Continental 
Army to the capital’s defense, but that even if he refused battle, Britain’s occupation of 
the city would tear the heart out of the rebellion and encourage Loyalists to rise up in 
support of Britain.  Recently promoted Lieutenant General Burgoyne’s mission was to 
cut rebellious New England off from the colonies to the south by seizing the key 
fortifications along the Hudson River.  Although he conquered Fort Ticonderoga, his 
ultimate defeat and surrender at the Battle of Saratoga in October 1777 led to a Franco-
American alliance in February 1778 which confronted Britain with a global imperial 
contest.  
The Franco-American alliance prompted the British to reallocate forces from 
America to defend more valuable colonies in the West Indies.72  The British Ministry 
intended to compensate for the dearth of troops by implementing a pacification policy 
aimed at winning the “hearts and minds” of Loyalists in the southern colonies.73  Despite 
its many initial successes, this shift in regional focus was not as profound as it initially 
appeared.  Lieutenant General Clinton’s capture of Charleston, South Carolina merely 
represented a continuation of the war of posts strategy.  The British Army sought to clear 
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areas of the Continental Army and Patriot militia and then turn these pacified areas over 
to Loyalist militia units who would serve as the local garrisons to prevent any future 
incursions.  This infusion of provincial troops would solve the undermanned garrison 
dilemma previously encountered in New Jersey and free up the regulars for continuous 
offensive action.  As will be further shown, this was exactly what Pattison tried to do in 
New York following his appointment as commandant.   
Clinton’s 1779 campaign began with an amphibious raid by 2,000 troops against 
Virginia.  Once those forces returned to New York they ascended the Hudson River for 
an attack against King’s Ferry, which was anchored by Stony Point on the western shore 
and Verplanck’s Point on the eastern bank.  While most colonels did not personally lead 
their regiments, Pattison did.  All eight companies in the 4th Battalion saw action in 
America during the War of Independence, and only one was absent from Pattison’s 
victory at the capture of Stony and Verplanck’s Points on June 1, 1779.  Sir Henry 
Clinton’s campaign plan for 1779 sought to compel Lieutenant General George 
Washington to participate in a decisive, conventional battle against the main British 
Army.  Clinton wanted to lure Washington out of his cantonments in Morristown, New 
Jersey by destroying vital supplies and threatening the Continental Army’s east-west line 
of communication closest to New York City.74  The American garrison on Stony Point 
fled at the arrival of the British flotilla late in the afternoon on May 30, which permitted 
Pattison, whom Clinton had put in command of all forces on the western bank, to 
establish gun emplacements during the night.  By five o’clock the next morning 
Pattison’s battery on Stony Point began to bombard the rebel fortification, Fort Lafayette, 
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across the river. The garrison of seventy-five men surrendered early that afternoon.  
General Pattison remained at Stony Point for the next nine days overseeing the 
construction of fortifications and then returned to New York City.75 
Pattison performed extremely well at Stony and Verplanck’s Points, 
demonstrating both leadership by example and technical expertise, but he did so under 
conditions that favored the British in almost every regard.  The British assault achieved 
complete surprise.  When Pattison and the approximately 1,431 men of the 17th, 63rd, 64th 
Regiments of Foot accompanied by 120 Hessian Jägers landed on the western shore of 
Stony Point they were largely unopposed because the 350-man Continental garrison 
destroyed its own defenses and retreated without firing a shot.  Pattison noted that, “A 
small Body of the Enemy made their appearance, but retired immediately on our landing- 
the Guns from the Opposite Fort [Lafayette] fir’d a great many Shot upon the Arm’d 
Galley’s that were stationed to cover our landing, but without effect.”76  Unopposed from 
the front, and safe from Fort La Fayette’s fire to the rear, the most difficult aspect of the 
operation was unloading the cannons and getting them up a 150-foot hill.  Pattison wrote, 
“The landing Place for the Cannon was very inconvenient, being of deep Mud, and the 
Hill they were to be drawn up craggy, and of uncommon steep Ascent, 58 men in 
Harness, besides many more shoving at the wheels, were scarcely able to get up a heavy 
12 P[ounde]r.”77  Within thirteen hours of landing Pattison’s troops established an 
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artillery park on top of Stony Point consisting of a 10-inch mortar, an 8-inch howitzer, 
and two 12-pounder cannons.  They discovered that the distance to Verplanck’s Point 
was twice as far as they had been led to believe, 1,500 vice 800 yards, but demonstrated 
excellent marksmanship nevertheless.  Hessian Jäger Captain Johann von Ewald watched 
the artillery barrage as he and his men laid siege to Fort Lafayette on the east side of the 
Hudson River.  Ewald credited Pattison’s precise bombardment for the rapid and 
casualty-free British victory over the Americans writing, "During the night General 
Pattison had erected a battery of two mortars and four heavy guns on Stony Point, from 
which side the fort was now cannonaded with very good effect.  Toward midday the fort 
surrendered after a loss of thirty killed and as many badly wounded.”78  Ewald certainly 
exaggerated the casualties suffered by the Americans since the North Carolina unit 
defending the post totaled seventy-five men and officers of whom only four died, but he 
had a front row view to the demoralizing effects that obviated a coup de main against the 
position. 
Back on the western side of the Hudson River Pattison diligently set his men to 
fortifying Stony Point.  His defenses demonstrated that he was a conscientious, if 
conventional military thinker, who had tactical blind spots due to his branch.  Pattison 
wrote to Lord Townshend,  
There is no Ground that can be said to Command it, except one Hill which is at  
upwards of a Mile Distance, but the almost unsurmountable Difficulty’s, which  
must attend bringing heavy Cannon over the Haverstraw Mountains makes any  
serious attack little to be expected, however I have Order’d all the Woods in our  
Front and on our right flank to be cut down, and Abbatis to be made in every Part  
of Practicable Approach.79 
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Whether Pattison was displaying his professional biases or simply playing to his audience 
by emphasizing the essential invulnerability of the position unless attacked by substantial 
artillery, other officers agreed with him.  Captain John Peebles, a Scottish Grenadier in 
the 42nd Regiment of Foot, noted in his diary, “over at Stoney point, the Works there very 
near finish’d, a strong post – 12 [artillery] pieces – the lozenge work round the 
Blockhouse N. 2 finish’d, with a fleche towards the River and an abbatis round the 
whole”80 
Pattison did more than just fortify Stony Point.  When General Clinton and Major 
General Vaughan departed on June 3rd they left Pattison in command of all of the forces 
at both Stony and Verplanck’s Points.  Left to his own initiative, Pattison took this 
opportunity to seek out supplies for his men and information about the rebels.  Informed 
by refugees that there were 500 cattle within six miles of his lines Pattison sent out a 
detachment of 500 men under Lieutenant Colonel Johnson on a night raid.  The action 
only netted forty to fifty cattle, but clearly demonstrated Pattison’s inclination to be 
proactive.81  Pattison demonstrated both his offensive spirit and his physical courage 
when he personally led a scouting party of fifty Jägers in search of 150 militiamen 
reported to be within two-and-a-half miles from the British posts.  This expedition did not 
encounter the Americans, but Pattison did gather some vital intelligence for his 
Commander-in-Chief.  During the Battle of Bennington on August 16, 1777, the 
Americans captured a Brunswicker by the name of Charles Tornier.  He joined the rebels 
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to end his internment as a prisoner of war (POW), and deserted from his duty station at 
West Point when he learned that the British Army was thirteen miles away.  Tornier 
provided Pattison with enough information to make a comprehensive sketch of West 
Point’s defenses and forwarded it to Clinton.82  On Saturday, June 12th, with the 
fortifications at Stony Point essentially complete, Pattison returned to New York City.  
Commandant	of	the	City	and	Garrison	of	New	York	
  
Although the battle of Stony and Verplanck’s Points was a lopsided affair that 
never seriously challenged the nearly 8,000 British soldiers engaged, Pattison 
demonstrated a number of admirable qualities that Sir Henry Clinton noticed.  Pattison’s 
“judicious exertions” during this opening phase of Clinton’s 1779 campaign thoroughly 
impressed the Commander-in-Chief and prompted him to appoint Pattison as 
Commandant of the City and Garrison of New York on July 5, 1779.83  This new 
administrative responsibility was in addition to his duties as the Commandant for the 
Royal Artillery in North America.  Pattison tried to relieve himself of those burdens by 
offering his resignation to the Board of Ordnance on May 2, 1779.  He told the Board, 
“The extensive & complicated Command I have is sufficiently onerous of itself- but 
under the present circumstances, the Weight becomes less supportable, I shou’d therefore 
be exceedingly glad if I might be permitted to transfer it to abler hands.”  Pattison 
confided his frustration to a friend two days later admitting that he was “quite jaded,” but 
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the Board did not accept his resignation and he remained in charge of the Royal Artillery 
for the duration of his stay in America.84  
Despite Pattison’s inability to resign from his warfighting duties associated with 
the Royal Artillery, his appointment as commandant of New York City nevertheless 
represented a strategic shift in his career.  His primary focus became the administration of 
the city and it consumed his waking hours.  As he wrote to Tryon, “The very desirable & 
pleasant Command, I am at present possess'd of, namely the Garrison & City of New 
York, so completely engages my mornings, that I have just now only Time to offer you 
my Warmest wishes."  He likewise informed Captain Chapman, “my present Situation as 
Commandant of this Garrison and City so fully occupies my time, that I can hardly find 
Leisure to write a Line.85 Pattison’s new role as Commandant of the City and Garrison of 
New York made him responsible for “His Majesty’s Forces on the Island of New York, 
Long Island, Staten Island and the Posts depending,” most notably Paulus Hook in 
modern-day Jersey city.86  His military duties emphasized the security of the posts as well 
as the discipline and welfare of the troops within them.  However, he also acquired 
unavoidable civil duties given the 25,000 civilians living in and around New York City.87   
The inherently hybrid civil-military nature of the commandant’s position 
demanded different approaches to the problems of rebellion and governance within the 
British lines.  With the exception of the Commander-in-Chief, no other British military 
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officer had such wide ranging and varied responsibilities which touched upon the core 
causes of the rebellion.  Pattison’s tenure as commandant provided him with the 
necessary insights to mobilize the military potential of the city’s inhabitants.  While 
battlefield victories would encourage Loyalism, they needed to be supplemented by 
effective governance, and a demonstration of the benefits of British rule. 
One of the most delicate aspects of this new situation was its implications for 
Pattison’s chain-of-command.  The Board of Ordnance remained one chain to which 
Pattison had to report.  He also had to serve Clinton in three separate capacities; first, by 
supporting the CINC’s campaign plans with the requisite artillery; second, by securing 
New York as a base of operations from which to launch those campaigns; and third, 
maintaining law and order within the city that housed Clinton’s headquarters.  There were 
numerous times when these goals conflicted, forcing Pattison to prioritize and alter policy 
accordingly. 
The 1779 campaign, which had such auspicious beginnings for both Clinton and 
Pattison at Stony and Verplanck’s Points, rapidly degenerated into a series of 
embarrassing and costly setbacks that put the British on the defensive.  On the night of 
July 15-16 Major General Anthony Wayne of Pennsylvania led 1,200 men of the 
Continental Corps of Light Infantry against the 624-man British garrison at Stony Point.  
Achieving complete surprise, Wayne captured the position within a mere twenty-five 
minutes.  The Americans lost fifteen killed and had another eighty-four men wounded, 
but captured 546 British troops while killing or dispersing another eighty.88  Clinton 
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responded with uncharacteristic celerity mounting a second expedition to recapture the 
positions.  Washington’s decision to evacuate the posts on July 18th, however, ensured 
another rapid yet largely meaningless victory for the British when they reoccupied the 
positions on the 20th.  British frustration regarding Stony Point culminated when Clinton 
withdrew the British garrisons into New York City in October fearing the arrival of a 
French fleet under the command of the Comte d’Estaing. 
The Americans’ unsuspected success, and the subsequent abandonment of the 
Stony and Verplanck’s Points, proved to be quite dispiriting to the British.  Upon hearing 
of Anthony Wayne’s capture Captain Peebles wrote, “The affair at Stony Point not so 
mortal as we hear'd at first [rumors of a massacre], but by all accounts they have been 
surprized, & the Rebels have gained a point, & perform'd an action, by which we have 
lost, & they have gain'd, much credit.”89   The shock permeated public opinion back in 
New York City as well.  Following Clinton’s recapture of the posts the Moravian 
minister Ewald Gustav Schaukirk commented, “it has been a bad stroke, a loss of several 
hundred men to our army."90 Captain Ewald lamented, "Perhaps we shall not take these 
important posts from Washington again so cheaply.  Once more, we are now no further 
than we were at the beginning of the campaign.-How easily can the plan of an entire 
campaign be upset by the negligence of an officer to whom a post is entrusted!"91  
Peebles echoed Ewald’s sentiments wryly observing that “the taking & making of [that 
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post], & the losing & taking & making again, has cost us 7 or 800 men & seems to have 
been the whole business or object of the Campaign.”92 
This criticism of Clinton’s campaign plan was ill-informed, since Clinton’s 
grandiose goal for the campaign of 1779 had been nothing less than the destruction of the 
Continental Army.  Unfortunately for Clinton, Rear Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot arrived 
four months late and brought 3,500 sickly reinforcements incapable of campaigning.  The 
arrival of D’Estaing’s fleet in American waters exacerbated Clinton’s perception of 
weakness which prompted him to hunker down in a defensive posture around New York 
City evacuating both Stony Point and Rhode Island.  Major General William Tryon led 
the only other offensive British actions that year consisting of amphibious raids against 
Connecticut.93 
 Pattison dutifully supported Clinton’s troop realignments and defended his 
commander-in-chief’s strategy.  Clinton ordered the evacuation of Newport, Rhode 
Island on October 4,, 1779, and the redeployment to New York only took two weeks from 
October 11-25, 1779.  One of the reasons that the troop movement went as smoothly as it 
did was the result of Pattison’s prior planning.  Long before any British officials 
contemplated evacuating Rhode Island, Pattison took the opportunity to visit the Royal 
Artillery company stationed there for fifteen days in March 1779.  During that trip he 
inspected the discipline and readiness of the artillerists and considered them to be “in the 
State and Condition, which I had Reason to expect under the Orders of so Good an 
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Officer” as their commander, Lieutenant Colonel John Innes, Sr.94  As soon as Clinton 
informed Pattison of his intent to evacuate Rhode Island, Pattison sent secret orders to 
Innes on September 26th to begin embarking “the Heavy Cannon and the most 
Cumbersome stores, now on Shore” without compromising the security of the post.  He 
also stressed the need for operational security writing, “I am persuaded you will transact 
this preparatory Business in such a Manner as shall mask the real Design as much as 
possible.”  Pattison, ever fiscally-minded, further advised Innes to secure additional 
transport vessels to prevent the significant losses that would result from having to destroy 
any artillery horses or forage left behind.95  Innes put the extra fifteen days to good use.  
He successfully embarked twenty field pieces, nine howitzers, seventeen mortars, and 
seventy-two iron guns of various sizes, in addition to all of their ammunition and 
gunpowder.  Innes further managed to find space aboard the transports for fifty-two of his 
seventy-two artillery horses.  Unfortunately, the Royal Artillery left behind one hundred 
forty-three tons of hay and oats, while the entire garrison left behind over 1200 tons for 
want of shipping.96  Even Thomas Jones, the Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
Province of New York and an implacable critic of Clinton, begrudgingly admitted the 
generally successful nature of the evacuation: “It is true the troops all came away, so did 
the Loyalists, the refugees, and every person obnoxious to rebellion.  The stores, 
provisions, and artillery were brought away, but all the wood and forage laid in for 6,000 
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men during the winter, were left behind.97  Pattison’s proactive leadership enabled his 
subordinates to accomplish this relocation in an exemplary fashion despite the shipping 
constraints.   
 Pattison also defended Clinton’s defensive strategy for both philosophical and 
personal reasons against Major General William Tryon’s calls for more aggressive action.  
Like Clinton, Pattison firmly fell into what historian Stephen Conway has referred to as 
the “conciliatory” camp; those British officers who either for moral reasons, enlightened 
notions of civility, or practical political considerations exercised restraint against rebels 
and the civilian population.  Tryon and other advocates of the fire and sword approach to 
subduing the rebellion, however, became the “hard-line.”98  Tryon averred, “The usurpers 
have professedly placed their hopes of severing the empire in avoiding decisive actions 
[and] upon the waste of the British treasures and the escape of their own property during 
the protraction of the war.”  Tryon sought to end the rebellion by turning the tables on the 
rebels with a scorched-earth policy designed to exhaust their bases of support.  Tryon 
further asserted that he would counter rebel “tyranny” with “general terror and 
despondency” which would not result in a political backlash along the Connecticut coast 
because the colonists there were “a people already divided, and settled on a coast 
everywhere thinly inhabited and easily impressible.”99  Tryon clearly saw time as being 
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on the side of the rebels and argued that Clinton’s defensive strategy played into their 
hands by exhausting Britain while not making any progress. 
 Tryon’s destructive amphibious raids against Connecticut in July 1779 provoked 
bitter recriminations against him throughout British Army Headquarters.  Commodore Sir 
George Collier, Commander-in-Chief of his Majesty’s Ships and Vessels in North 
America, and Tryon issued a joint warning on July 4th to the inhabitants of Connecticut 
that the British “forbearance you have ungenerously construed into fear; but whose lenity 
has persisted in its mild and noble efforts, even though branded with the most unworthy 
imputation” would soon come to an end.100  With the population thus duly warned, the 
two men led 2,600 soldiers to New Haven, East Haven, Fairfield, and Norwalk.  British 
forces plundered the first two towns and burned the latter two supposedly because snipers 
fired at the British soldiers from concealed positions within the houses.  Tryon’s 
admission that two churches had been destroyed in the conflagration convinced Clinton 
to put a halt to any further raids.101  According to Loyalist William Smith, Chief Justice 
of New York from 1763 to 1782, when Tryon returned he and Pattison had a heated 
exchange about the political consequences of his actions.  Pattison demanded, “What 
Commander-in-Chief will dare to burn and bring on himself the censures of the 
opposition?”  Tryon exploded, “You’ll do nothing then till you find a general regardless 
of all factions and attached to his King and country!”102  Tryon was convinced that 
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Clinton and his supporters would use any excuse, including criticism from members of 
Parliament who opposed the war, to justify Clinton’s overly-cautious inactivity.  Tryon, 
meanwhile, insisted that much more could be done with the forces on hand, and that duty 
to the King and country demanded greater exertions in subduing the rebellion. 
Although this confrontation was largely the result of ideological differences, its 
intensity came from Tryon’s multiple affronts towards Pattison at the beginning of the 
campaign.  Without consulting Pattison, Tryon made his own determination regarding 
how much artillery the raids would require and managed to have Clinton issue the orders.  
Tryon’s maneuver to go around Pattison not only insulted his technical expertise, but 
demonstrated Tryon’s arrogance by asserting his recently-granted seniority over him.  
Tryon’s contempt for Clinton was also well-known, so the willingness of Pattison’s 
patron to grant favors to one of his critics over his client added insult to injury.103  
Despite these hard feelings, Pattison maintained his professionalism, and dutifully 
provided Tryon’s expedition with Captain Traille’s artillery company equipped with four 
three-pounders and one howitzer as requested.104 
The next major expedition Pattison supported as Commandant of the Royal 
Artillery in North America was Clinton’s siege of Charleston, South Carolina.  In 1779 
Secretary of State for the American Department Lord George Germain suggested that 
Henry Clinton should implement the Southern strategy, but left the final discretion up to 
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the general.  Clinton acceded to Germain’s wishes for a Southern offensive, but left a 
sizeable garrison to defend New York City.  On December 26th, Clinton departed for 
Charleston with 8,500 soldiers and received substantial reinforcements during the siege 
that brought his total strength up to 14,000.105  During this time Clinton left 10,000 troops 
in New York under the command of Lieutenant General Baron Wilhelm von 
Knyphausen, Commander-in-Chief of the Hessian forces.  Pattison supported the 
Charleston expedition by sending Captain George Rochfort’s entire company to join 
Captain William Johnstone’s company and another detachment of thirty-men already 
assigned to Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis for a total of one hundred and 
sixty men.  Pattison needed to hire another transport ship, Rosamond, to carry the 
cannons which consisted of at least sixty 24 pounders, eight 30 pounders, four 6 
pounders, two 3 pounders, and a number of howitzers.106  Clinton’s six-week-long siege 
of Charleston, from March 29 – May 12, 1780, culminated in the capture of 5,000 
Continental soldiers under the command of Major General Benjamin Lincoln.   
While Pattison’s military duties for the Royal Artillery were demanding, his 
responsibilities for defending New York City and the “posts depending” – including 
Long Island, Staten Island, and Paulus Hook - presented an even greater challenge.  
These locations encompassed an area of 1,671 square miles, some 400 square miles 
larger than the entire colony of Rhode Island.  Even more daunting, commandants only 
had a minuscule portion of the army detailed to them for garrison duty, leaving the rest in 
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theory available for operations outside the city.  For example, in November 1779 Pattison 
only had direct command over four Hessian grenadier battalions, the 42nd Scottish 
Regiment, the 54th Regiment, Skinner’s 2nd Battalion, and the heavy artillery.  This 
amounted to approximately 4,000 of the 18,500 British and Hessian troops in and around 
New York City.107   Considering their extensive geographical responsibilities and paltry 
assigned forces, commandants needed to carefully coordinate the efforts amongst the 
British forces to secure New York City.    
As the garrison commander Pattison maintained the city’s defenses by strictly 
observing the chain of command and establishing a good rapport with as many of the 
other military commanders in the region as possible because he was junior to many of 
them.  Pattison’s nominal subordinates for the purpose of defending the city, prior to the 
departure of the Charleston expedition,  included Major General Edward Matthew on 
Manhattan, Lieutenant General Lord Charles Cornwallis on Long Island, and Loyalist 
Brigadier General Cortlandt Skinner on Staten Island.108The presence of the Commander-
in-Chief and his headquarters staff within the city complicated the chain of command.  In 
most other occupied cities, the commandant was the senior ranking officer with all 
military forces assigned underneath him.  When the commandant in New York wanted to 
use forces other than those assigned to him, he had to request them from the Commander-
in-Chief.109   This was true even when the commandant outranked the unit’s commander.  
The commandants could, however, rely on personal relationships to get the support that 
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they needed.  In an impressive display of Army-Navy cooperation, in the winter of 1780 
Pattison persuaded Royal Navy Captain Tryingham Howe to detach 330 seamen from the 
fleet in New York harbor to serve in Manhattan’s redoubts.110 
The “Posts depending” that the commandants were responsible for defending 
posed more practical challenges of command and control because of the difficulty of 
communicating with them.  The Patriots’ raid on Paulus Hook on August 19, 1779 was 
an excellent example.  This post, located on the west bank of the Hudson River, was vital 
to protecting the harbor.  Lieutenant Mackenzie explained, “The possession of this post 
[Paulus Hook] secures the principal anchorage in the North [Hudson] River, and renders 
the communication with the North part of the town, by water, safe.”111  American 
Lieutenant Colonel “Light Horse” Henry Lee led a daring early morning assault on the 
position, and although he failed to destroy it, he eliminated the garrison by capturing 150 
prisoners.112  The surprise action caught the rest of the city’s defenders off-guard which 
prevented them from sending any timely assistance.  In the wake of this debacle, 
Commandant Pattison established early warning signals for all of the city’s outlying posts 
which consisted of anywhere from one to six cannon shots for the posts in northern 
Manhattan, and three vertical lights for Paulus Hook.113  Although the rebels raided New 
York innumerable times after their victory at Paulus Hook, they were unable to equal its 
success. 
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Just as Pattison rectified his difficulties with coordination between the forces 
needed for defense through local-level initiatives, the office of commandant also 
provided the authority to implement policies to alleviate his manpower shortfalls.  
Pattison did this by raising militia units from the city’s inhabitants.  New York’s Royal 
Governor William Tryon set the precedent when he raised the first Loyalist volunteer 
company in October 1776, and by November 22, 1777 twenty such units existed.114  
During the winter of 1780 when the rivers surrounding New York City froze, eliminating 
its natural moat, Pattison mobilized the militia with both the carrot and the stick.  He 
decided to test the inhabitants’ proclamation from the previous November that stated, 
“we freely offer ourselves to be formed in such military array as shall be thought proper” 
by asking for volunteers while simultaneously conscripting all men between the ages of 
seventeen and sixty. 115  The only exemptions that he granted were to men already in the 
Provincial militias, 260 firefighters, and 140 Quakers because of their pacifist religious 
convictions.116  This raised 2,662 militiamen which augmented the 3,135 men in the 
volunteer companies and seamen for a grand total of 5,797.117  The commandant paid 
special attention to the rules and regulations he developed for the militias to maximize 
participation and combat effectiveness.   He empowered the militia captains to judge 
excuses of members who failed to report for duty.  Those suspected of shirking their duty 
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during an alarm were jailed in the “Main Guard” which was the prison on the lower floor 
of City Hall.  Delinquents who failed to attend the minimum biweekly practice drills 
were fined, first for two dollars, and then two additional dollars for each repeat offense.  
The fines went into the city funds and were used to pay for weapons for indigent 
militiamen and other services for the poor.118 
Pattison’s singular success in raising and calling out the militia stemmed from his 
perceived military competence and hands-on leadership style.  Pattison impressed both 
subordinates and superiors with the military results he achieved.  On April 28, 1778 
Grenadier Peebles commented, “The Royl. Artillery had a Review today in the Common, 
they went thro' the old fashion'd things in Battalion with 2 6 pors. [pounders] On each 
flank; they look very well & are much improved since [James] Pattison came."119  
Clinton summed up Pattison’s exploits at Stony Point thusly: “His exertions and good 
arrangements, seconded by the cheerful labour of the troops, gave me the satisfaction of 
seeing a battery of cannon and mortars opened at the next morning on the summit of this 
difficult rock.  Their effect was soon perceived.”120  Men cheerfully submitting to his will 
and following him into battle, his ability to rapidly accomplish arduous tasks, and the 
initial success of the Stony Point operation all gave Pattison a patina of military glory that 
was enthusiastically reported by the local press for public consumption. 
Contrary to Clinton’s claims that the militia only mobilized in the winter of 
1779/1780 because of the imminent threat of invasion, the militia continued to grow in 
size and skill throughout Pattison’s tenure.  One month prior to Pattison’s departure in 
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September of 1780, and long after winter ice had made Manhattan temporarily vulnerable 
to a land assault, Hessian Lieutenant John Charles Philip von Krafft commented, “The 
militia of the city was daily increased and well divided into several regiments and 
equipments.”121  Major Baurmeister was equally impressed with Pattison’s martial 
abilities observing, “We were not only in the best defensive position but benefited from 
the fact that the inhabitants of this city are faithful royalists. Within a week’s time, as the 
enclosed list [missing] will show, they armed and uniformed over five thousand men.”122  
Clinton may have been correct that the threat of invasion was the proximate cause that 
created the militia, but continued expansion of the system in the absence of immediate 
danger is indicative of Pattison’s leadership.   
Pattison’s effect upon discipline and readiness emanated from his personal 
attention to all matters, great and small.  On June 29, 1779, a little more than two weeks 
after he departed Stony Point, he grilled Captain Traille about the progress of the 
defenses and why his earlier orders about establishing a powder magazine had not yet 
been executed.123  Pattison freely delegated, but he did not hesitate to step in when he felt 
that subordinates overlooked their duties.  He ordered new gun carriages and paint jobs 
for thirty-six cannons on Manhattan and Governor’s Island.  He likewise ordered four 6-
pounders, two 3-pounders, and one 4.4 inch howitzer be placed on snow sleighs so that 
they could be rapidly repositioned during the winter of 1780.  He also ordered Joshua 
Loring, British Commissary of Prisoners, to fix the fence around the North Church Prison 
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to ensure that no prisoners escaped  His omnipresence at review parades, inspecting the 
city’s defenses, and public functions gave him an aura of omniscience.124 
The final characteristic that served Pattison well as a leader of men was his 
genuine gratitude.  He put his observant nature to good use by going out of his way to 
thank and the praise the troops whenever he could.  This inspired a degree of loyalty that 
few other senior British leaders possessed.  When the citizens of New York first offered 
to form a militia Pattison responded that their gesture “will ever redound to your credit, 
as it must evince to the world the sincereity of your loyal professions.”125  Later Pattison 
congratulated the citizens because, “So very numerous and respectable a body of Militia 
being enrolled and assembled under arms, in the short space of seven days after issuing 
the Proclamation, must reflect a lasting credit upon them, and deserves the highest 
commendation.”  He went on to recognize the “very military dress and appearance of the 
Independent and Volunteer City Companies” and credited them with “first setting this 
laudable example” of enlistment throughout the city which had been long overdue.126  
When members of the militia and the associated refugees built a new redoubt along the 
East River Pattison extolled the “lasting credit to themselves” for the fortification’s  
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“very satisfactory Manner” and thanked them for “this fresh Instance” of their “readiness 
and good Will.”127 
An additional responsibility for defense that fell under Pattison’s purview, and 
one that caused significant hardships, was fortification of the city and its surroundings.  
New York’s prewar Justice of the Supreme Court Thomas Jones wrote, “The office of the 
Commandant of the City, with a number of other useless, lucrative employments, 
contrived to rob the nation, and fill the pockets of favourites.”128  Although Jones had 
many grievances against British officials, he felt that they unnecessarily spent £300,000 
rebuilding rebel fortifications on Staten Island and placing new defenses around 
Manhattan and Long Island.129  While his fellow Loyalists might not have concluded that 
peculation was responsible for the new defensive works, they certainly shared his disdain 
of having the militias perform their duty by working on the fortifications without any 
compensation other than the meager rations that their regular counterparts received.130  
Although these hardships understandably caused complaints amongst the population, they 
appear to have been prudent given the military threat the French fleet posed to New York 
following France’s entry into the war.  French Admiral Count d’Estaing blockaded New 
York in July 1778 before proceeding to Newport, Rhode Island.  The French planned a 
coordinated amphibious assault with Washington against New York in July 1780, but the 
British launched a preventative strike and blockaded the French fleet in Newport.   
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Another military responsibility of the city commandant that rankled the civilian 
population was administering the city’s quartering policy for troops.  Although the 
Barrack Master General’s Department oversaw day-to-day operations, it reported to the 
commandant.  Cognizant of American sensitivities to boarding soldiers, but forced to 
make use of all available space within the city to accommodate the forces, Pattison tried 
to prevent the worst abuses and did everything he could to assuage hostilities caused by 
poor conduct.  The case of Mr. Joshua Pell in February 1780 was commonplace during 
the time.  Pell provided housing for twenty-seven cavalrymen in the Queen’s Rangers 
under Lieutenant Allan McNabb who wore out their welcome by behaving “…in a very 
unruly manner by breaking open an apartment and taking away his Poultry, making use 
of his Hay and burning his Firewood in a very lavish manner, as also being very Noisy & 
troublesome to himself and Family.”131  Commandant Pattison ordered an immediate 
investigation into the complaint and demanded swift punishment for any guilty parties.  If 
boarding in private homes was offensive, commandeering places of worship was 
anathema.  Although the British Army spared the Episcopal churches, St. Paul’s and St. 
George’s, they used the French Church, North Dutch Church, Baptist Church, and 
Quaker Meeting House as barracks and hospitals.132  Pattison, ever eager to assuage 
resentments, apologized to the minister of the North Dutch Church for imposing 
wounded soldiers upon him, thanked him on their behalf, and vacated the premises as the 
earliest possible time.133 
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 Last, but certainly not least, among the commandants’ security charges was to 
protect the city against spies.  Throughout the war British and Hessian forces complained 
about the disparity between the Patriots’ intelligence gathering capabilities and that of the 
British Army.  On March 17, 1777 General William Howe’s Hessian aide de camp, 
Captain Friederich von Muenchhausen, wrote “We never know these two things 
[enemy’s location and strength] because of our lack of good spies. The farmers are 
generally in favor of the rebels and are careful not to give us any information, especially 
since the English do not know how to pay spies.”134  Although the British improved their 
spy networks over the years, so too did the rebels, and, as a result, the New York City 
garrison remained highly susceptible to penetration.  Pattison worked to counter this 
threat by limiting access within the city’s defensive perimeter.  One of the tricks of war, 
or ruse de guerre, that the Patriots’ employed was using female spies who entered the 
city under the pretext of selling their provisions at market.135  Another favorite ploy was 
to send spies under a flag of truce to conduct reconnaissance of the city’s fortifications.  
Commandant Pattison put an end to these practices by keeping all messengers with flags 
of truce outside of the city’s most advanced pickets, and establishing a weekly exchange 
of flags by a single British vessel.136  Eager to impede the spy networks that operated 
from Elizabeth Town, through Staten Island, and into New York he also required passes 
for all boat traffic. 
                                                            
134Friedrich Ernst von Muenchhausen, At General Howe's Side, 1776‐1778 : The Diary of General 
William Howe's Aide De Camp, Captain Friedrich Von Muenchhausen., trans., Ernst Kipping.  Annotated by 
Samuel Stelle Smith., Philip Freneau Press Bicentennial Series on the American Revolution (Monmouth 
Beach, N.J.: Philip Freneau Press, 1974), 10. 
 
135Pattison, Official Letters of James Pattison, 367. 
 
136Pattison, Official Letters of James Pattison, 228, 255, 276. 
54 
 In order to be a successful commandant Pattison had to negotiate the competing 
interests of the military and civilian populations in New York City.  In many respects his 
position resembled that of the Commander-in-Chief on a smaller scale because he had to 
implement downward-directed military and political policies while trying to fight the war 
on his superiors’ terms.  Starting in 1776 with Major General James Robertson the 
commandants pursued a pacification policy designed to improve the quality of life in the 
city to the point where it coaxed the fence-sitters in the surrounding areas to return to 
their “proper” allegiance.  Commandant Robertson maintained, “I always considered the 
great object of the war to be the regaining of the people, and to do this by letting them see 
we were their friends.”137  Pattison focused his efforts on law and order, regulating 
markets and commerce, and providing relief to displaced refugees and other indigents to 
show his good intentions towards the inhabitants of New York.   
 Restoring law and order to New York City in the wake of its occupation proved 
much more difficult than expected.  The occupying force immediately established martial 
law, but the stresses placed on the city’s occupants by wartime conditions of 
overcrowding and scarcity made maintaining order challenging.  Pattison and his 
predecessors attacked the disorder with a two-pronged strategy that relied on military 
justice and a new hybrid organization known as a Court of Police. 
 Unit commanders were responsible for enforcing military discipline upon their 
subordinates. When they failed to do so, resulting in harm to the civilian population, 
Pattison stepped in to reprimand the commanding officers and seek punishment for the 
guilty parties.  The two endemic offenses perpetrated by British soldiers were plundering 
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and destroying private property for firewood.138  Commandant Pattison attempted to 
curtail these nefarious nighttime activities with enhanced patrols.  He employed three 
Hessian regiments and had them randomly vary the times and directions of their 
march.139  These conventional approaches curbed the worst abuses, but could not stamp 
out the pillaging. 
 The Court of Police, on the other hand, was an innovation designed to provide 
justice for a population deprived of civilian courts.  This, of course, begs two questions: 
first, why were the courts closed; and second, what prevented the British Army from 
reopening them once they occupied the city?  The surprising answer to the first question 
is that the courts remained open during the American occupation, but once the British 
Army “liberated” the city they closed them. William Howe did so because he, like many 
other British officials, believed that the Prohibitory Act of 1775 abolished civil 
government in the colonies.  Even those who disagreed, and argued that the Prohibitory 
Act only applied to trade, acquiesced after the Declaration of Independence.140  The 
military kept the civilian courts closed because they feared that if they reopened them 
they would be buried in an avalanche of litigation concerning their foraging and 
quartering practices.  Military leaders developed the Court of Police as a balance between 
military necessity and civil justice.  On May 1, 1777 William Howe established the first 
Court of Police in Manhattan.  It consisted of a three-member panel of judges made up of 
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prominent Loyalists: Superintendent Andrew Elliot, Deputy Superintendent David 
Matthew, and Assistant Magistrate Peter Dubois.  The court had jurisdiction over all 
cases worth up to £10.141  James Robertson established three more Courts of Police in 
1780 upon his appointment as the Royal Governor.  These courts never completely 
placated the civilians who demanded the restoration of full civil government, but their 
usefulness was clearly evident as the British government replicated them when they 
occupied Philadelphia and Charleston.142 
 Trade was the lifeblood of New York’s economy.  While the Prohibitory Act of 
1775 permitted the colonies in rebellion to import goods from England, it prevented them 
from exporting to any ports within the empire.  This effectively brought commerce to a 
standstill because without the revenues generated from the export business New York 
merchants did not have the capital or credit necessary to purchase imports.  British 
military leaders in New York realized that reviving the local economy would play a 
critical role in supporting Britain’s war effort.  Not only was it a military necessity to 
keep the troops and inhabitants of the city provisioned, but fostering trade was the most 
effective way for British officials to demonstrate the benevolence and benefits of 
remaining within the empire.  The most significant military concern, of course, was to 
prevent the newly restored trade from supplying the Patriots.  On July 17, 1777 William 
Howe used his authority as a peace commissioner to grant permission to select New York 
merchants to carry on trade under strict regulations to curtail smuggling.  Ship captains 
had to declare all cargo upon entering the port, provide certified manifests to local 
officials, and impound liquor, sugar, molasses, and salt at their own expense until the 
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goods could be inspected.  Any undeclared items were subject to seizure.143  New York’s 
trade with the empire rebounded rapidly.  In 1777 a Hessian soldier stationed in New 
York, Johann Conrad Döhla, wrote “Their most important trade, however, is with 
England, to whom they send furs, naval supplies, and copper and receive in exchange all 
sorts of European wares.”144  Encouraged by these promising initial results the Carlisle 
Peace Commission suspended the Prohibitory Act for New York City in 1778.  This led 
to an explosive growth in trade and restored prosperity to New York’s loyal merchants.  
By May 1779 Major Baurmeister noted, “The amount of merchandise, the number of rich 
warehouses, the uninterrupted trade, and the coming and going of ships cannot be 
described vividly enough.”145 
 Despite New York City’s economic rebound, its tenuous position at the end of a 
3,000 mile supply line, coupled with the plodding transportation across the Atlantic, led 
to times of severe shortages. Pattison wrote to Lieutenant General George Townshend, 4th 
Viscount Townshend and Master-General of the Ordnance from 1772 to 1782, about the 
arrival of a provisions fleet to New York City in January 1779, stating, “They came in 
two Days ago, and nothing could be more opportune, as there has not been a Barrel of 
Flour in the publick Store for some Weeks past, and the Oatmeal, which has been 
substituted in lieu of it for the Ammunition Bread, reduced to a trifling Quantity.”146  
Although this might sound alarmist, Pattison’s assessment of the food shortage has been 
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verified by the calculations of historian R. Arthur Bowler who estimated that New York 
City’s ration supply was so severely depleted in January 1779 that the British had less 
than one week of reserves.  Throughout the entire war there was only one other instance, 
during November 1780, in which New York City’s storehouses were similarly barren.147 
 Commandant Pattison served as both enforcer and policymaker in the economic 
realm.  Clearly the larger decisions about the Prohibitory Act were made above his level; 
however, his decisions to either enforce or flout them had substantial consequences for 
the local economy.  This was especially true regarding the regulations on smuggling.  
Despite Commandant Pattison’s official prohibitions against smuggling, and strict 
enforcement of his regulations to prevent the sale of gunpowder or weapons to the rebels, 
he permitted an illegal trade of salt to secure cattle and sheep for the city.148  This so-
called “London Trade” secured food for the city while providing Americans outside of 
British lines with a scarce vital preservative.  Even Pattison’s most vociferous civilian 
critics approved of this action.  Judge Thomas Jones supported the smuggling arguing 
that as long as no military supplies were sent to the rebels the trade actually hurt them by 
draining their specie reserves while securing an abundance of fresh provisions for the 
city.149 
When it came to economic activity within New York, Commandant Pattison ruled 
supreme.  He regulated every form of commercial transaction.  He fixed prices for house 
rents, firewood, flour, wagon rentals, ferry fares, dock charges, and a myriad of other 
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goods and services.  He did this in an effort to stop the runaway inflation caused by 
wartime scarcity, hoarders, and a thriving black market.  Pattison also used economic 
regulations as a way to keep order in the town.  The most notable example of this was the 
requirement for pubs and distilleries to have licenses to operate in the city.  Pattison 
limited the soldiers’ and sailors’ access to liquor by only issuing two hundred licenses.150  
The commandants regularly revoked these licenses from curators whose business 
practices were harmful to the good order and discipline of the garrison. 
The final way in which Pattison profoundly influenced the quality of life within 
the city was to revive the civil vestry to provide relief to the poor.  Commandant 
Robertson instituted this policy during his tenure by creating a vestry of nineteen men, 
representing all of the wards of the city, to disburse public funds.  With no civil 
government to levy taxes, Robertson had to secure other funding sources.  He decided to 
use the rent paid by Loyalists living in Patriot homes in addition to the licensing fees for 
ferries, markets, and liquor.  He also created a lottery to support the program, and later 
commandants funneled all fines paid to the Court of Police into the program.151  The 
vestry and its many funding programs proved to be tremendously successful and provided 
£65,000 of aid from 1778 through 1780.  The commandants also allowed Loyalist 
refugees to live in abandoned rebel property for free in many instances.  Later in the war 
when Governor Robertson decided to confiscate rebel property, he and the commandant 
sent the proceeds to the city funds, and the vestry was then responsible for dividing it up 
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among impoverished refugees within the city with the approval of the governor or 
commandant.  These confiscations all occurred under martial law.   
Despite the numerous hardships endured by the inhabitants of New York during 
James Pattison’s tenure as commandant, they overwhelmingly approved of his conduct.  
When the city volunteered to form the militia companies they noted Pattison’s “wise and 
prudent regulations you have been pleased to establish for our welfare and security; and 
to assure you, that we consider them a certain earnest of your steady, just, honourable and 
happy administration” and were confident that he appreciated their “predicament, as 
citizens, to their necessary private duties and employment” and would therefore not abuse 
the militiamen by calling them out too regularly.152 
Conclusion	
 
Major General James Pattison faced a host of bureaucratic, military, and political 
challenges as the Commandant of the City and Garrison of New York between July 5, 
1779 and August 13, 1780.  His hybrid civil-military responsibilities permitted him to 
showcase his military expertise while simultaneously demonstrating his goodwill towards 
the inhabitants of New York City.  Pattison’s unique position as commandant, coupled 
with his intrinsic leadership abilities, enabled him to mobilize the militia on an 
unprecedented scale. 
The greatest bureaucratic challenge Pattison faced during his dual tenures as 
Commander of the Royal Artillery and Commandant of the City and Garrison of New 
York was that the Royal Artillery was not organizationally part of the British Army.  
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Therefore, as Commander of the Royal Artillery in North America, his administrative 
chain-of-command ran from the king through the Board of Ordnance, even though he was 
assigned to the army with the rank of brigadier general for the purpose of supporting the 
main army when it went on campaign.  This placed Pattison in the precarious position of 
having two military bosses, the Commander-in-Chief of North America and the Board of 
Ordnance.  When priorities between the CINC and the Board of Ordnance conflicted, 
Pattison usually sided with the CINC because he was physically closer, he offered better 
patronage once Sir Henry Clinton assumed the post, and the CINC provided Pattison with 
the resources he needed to accomplish his assigned missions.    
Although Pattison became disillusioned with the Board of Ordnance and tried to 
resign his commission as Commandant of the Royal Artillery in America, the Board 
refused.  However, this was fortunate because it was his command of the Royal Artillery 
at the British capture of Stony Point in June 1779 that permitted Pattison to demonstrate 
his professional and leadership qualities to Clinton.  Impressed by his technical expertise 
and physical courage, Clinton appointed Pattison as the Commandant of the City and 
Garrison of New York.   
Pattison’s major success during his tenure as commandant was his mobilization of 
the militia during the danger posed in the winter of 1779 and 1780 when the harbors froze 
over and New York was open to a land assault.  During that crisis 5,797 militiamen and 
volunteers mustered in defense of the city.  Pattison’s prudent policies and inspiring 
leadership clearly made the difference.  Upon his return from the Charleston campaign 
Clinton publicly praised him writing, “The Zeal testified by the Inhabitants to oppose the 
Enemy, evince the Confidence and Esteem you have Merited from them, as well as a 
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Courage and Loyalty highly to be respected.”153  There was only one successful large-
scale rebel assault against the city during his command, namely Lieutenant Colonel 
Henry Lee’s raid on Paulus Hook on August 19, 1779.  Pattison promptly implemented 
new defensive measures including signals, fortifications, and troop realignments that 
prevented Major General William Alexander on two separate occasions, January 5th and 
14th 1780 from catching the Staten Island garrison by surprise with a large force of 3,000 
men.  Once the attack began, Pattison rapidly ferried reinforcements across the Hudson 
River convincing Alexander to call off the assault.154 
When it came to civil administration Pattison was not an innovator. Instead he 
largely continued programs and policies that his predecessors established.  Lieutenant 
General James Robertson, the city’s first commandant following its conquest by British 
forces in 1776, deserves the credit for most of the programs designed to improve life in 
the city such as the collection of rents, lotteries, and imposition of fines which all went to 
the city’s vestries to provide poor and refugee relief.  Nor did Pattison originate the Board 
of Police which served as a substitute for the royal courts under martial law.  However, it 
was Pattison’s implementation of policy and utilization of the tools at his disposal that set 
him apart from his predecessors.  He judiciously delegated authority to the Board of 
Police and Chamber of Commerce so prominent loyal inhabitants could help him 
formulate policy to meet the requirements of the larger war effort, the defense of the city, 
and the inhabitants’ rights.  The community’s respect for Pattison came from his 
demonstrated “unwilling[ness] that [the] faintest shadow of Inattention to the Rights of a 
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Citizen should appear during his Administration.”155  The end result was a clear 
demonstration that reliance upon Loyalist militia for garrison duty, which released the 
British Army to conduct offensive operations, was a viable “northern strategy” as well as 
a “southern” one. 
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